Quick review: I recently read Warfighting by the US Marine Corp on the recommendation of a friend. Running a brief 84 pages, it is insightful and packed full of wisdom, entirely devoid of fluff, and very much to the point (as one would expect from the military). It was first written in 1989 as a manual to outline "the way Marines think about warfare." 

It was striking how much of the book and its truths apply to warfare, but more broadly to business, investing, and life. If you remove the combat-related terms and apply the approach to say, building a startup, the insight holds true. For example:

Speed is rapidity of action. It applies to both time and space. Speed over time is tempo-the consistent ability to operate quickly. Speed over distance, or space, is the ability to move rapidly. Both forms are genuine sources of combat power. In other words, speed is a weapon. In war, it is relative speed that matters rather than absolute speed.

We want to attack the source of enemy strength, but we do not want to attack directly into that strength. We obviously stand a better chance of success by concentrating our strength against some relative enemy weakness. So we also ask ourselves: Where is the enemy vulnerable?

Replacing 'war' with 'startups', and 'enemy' with 'incumbent' yields:

Speed is rapidity of action. It applies to both time and space. Speed over time is tempo-the consistent ability to operate quickly. Speed over distance, or space, is the ability to move rapidly. Both forms are genuine sources of combat power. In other words, speed is a weapon. In startups, it is relative speed that matters rather than absolute speed.

We want to attack the source of the incumbent's strength, but we do not want to attack directly into that strength. We obviously stand a better chance of success by concentrating our strength against some relative incumbent weakness. So we also ask ourselves: Where is the incumbent vulnerable?

I imagine that advice (or similar) has been given in countless board meetings. What's interesting is it comes across as a truism. But, coming from the military, where execution is everything, it is clear that simple does not mean easy. 

Since war is a fluid phenomenon, its conduct requires flexibility of thought. Success depends in large part on the ability to adapt-to proactively shape changing events to our advantage as well as to react quickly to constantly changing conditions.

This statement is straightforward and logical. But if it was easy to implement within an organization, disruption from an upstart wouldn't be a thing and Clayton Christensen's The Innovator's Dilemma wouldn't be a best seller.

A quick and easy read worth sitting with and pondering.

Book Highlights:

The essence of war is a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other. War is fundamentally an interactive social process.

It is critical to keep in mind that the enemy is not an inanimate object to be acted upon but an independent and animate force with its own objectives and plans

Total war and perfect peace rarely exist in practice. Instead, they are extremes between which exist the relations among most political groups. This range includes routine economic competition, more or less permanent political or ideological tension, and occasional crises among groups

While we should attempt to minimize self-induced friction, the greater requirement is to fight effectively despite the existence of friction. One essential means to overcome friction is the will; we prevail over friction through persistent strength of mind and spirit. While striving ourselves to overcome the effects of friction, we must attempt at the same time to raise our enemy's friction to a level that weakens his ability to fight

While we try to reduce these unknowns by gathering information, we must realize that we cannot eliminate them–or even come close. The very nature of war makes certainty impossible; all actions in war will be based on incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information.

Like friction and uncertainty, fluidity is an inherent attribute of war. Each episode in war is the temporary result of a unique combination of circumstances, presenting a unique set of problems and requiring an original solution. Nevertheless, no episode can be viewed in isolation. Rather, each episode merges with those that precede and follow it-shaped by the former and shaping the conditions of the latter-creating a continuous, fluctuating flow of activity replete with fleeting opportunities and unforeseen events. Since war is a fluid phenomenon, its conduct requires flexibility of thought. Success depends in large part on the ability to adapt-to proactively shape changing events to our advantage as well as to react quickly to constantly changing conditions.

We cannot hope to impose precise, positive control over events. The best we can hope for is to impose a general framework of order on the disorder, to influence the general flow of action rather than to try to control each event.

Leaders must study fear, understand it, and be prepared to cope with it.

War is both timeless and ever changing. While the basic nature of war is constant, the means and methods we use evolve continuously...It is important to understand which aspects of war are likely to change and which are not.

Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held.

War is an extension of both policy and politics with the addition of military force. Policy and politics are related but not synonymous, and it is important to understand war in both contexts. Politics refers to the distribution of power through dynamic interaction, both cooperative and competitive, while policy refers to the conscious objectives established within the political process. The policy aims that are the motive for any group in war should also be the foremost determinants of its conduct. The single most important thought to understand about our theory is that war must serve policy.

We should recognize that war is not an inanimate instrument, but an animate force which may likely have unintended consequences that may change the political situation.

When the policy motive of war is extreme, such as the destruction of an enemy government, then war's natural military tendency toward destruction will coincide with the political aim, and there will tend to be few political restrictions on the military conduct of war. On the other hand, the more limited the policy motive, the more the military tended toward destruction be at variance with that motive, and the more likely political considerations will restrict the application of military force. Commanders must recognize that since military action must serve policy, these political restrictions on military action may be perfectly correct. At the same time, military leaders have a responsibility to advise the political leadership when the limitations imposed on military action jeopardize the military's ability to accomplish its assigned mission.

The second approach is to convince the enemy that accepting our terms will be less painful than continuing to resist. This is a strategy of erosion, using military force to erode the enemy leadership's will.

There are two ways to use military force to impose our will on an enemy. The first is to make the enemy helpless to resist us by physically destroying his military capabilities. The aim is the elimination, permanent or temporary, of the enemy's military power. This has historically been called a strategy of annihilation,

At the highest level, war involves the use of all the elements of power that one political group can bring to bear against another. These include, for example, economic, diplomatic, military, and psychological forces. Our primary concern is with the use of military force. Nevertheless, while we focus on the use of military force, we must not consider it in isolation from the other elements of national power.

Activities in war take place at several interrelated levels which form a hierarchy. These levels are the strategic, operational, and tactical.

By taking the initiative, we dictate the terms of the conflict and force the enemy to meet us on our terms. The initiative allows us to pursue some positive aim even if only to preempt an enemy initiative. It is through the initiative that we seek to impose our will on the enemy.

We do not necessarily assume the defensive only out of weakness. For example, the defense may confer the initiative if the enemy is compelled to attack into the strength of our defense. Under such conditions, we may have the positive aim of destroying the enemy. Similarly, a defender waiting in ambush have the initiative if the enmay emy can be brought into the trap. The defense may be another way of striking at the enemy.

The offense and defense exist simultaneously as necessary components of each other, and the transition from one to the other is fluid and continuous.

Instead of attacking enemy strength, the goal is the application of our strength against selected enemy weakness in order to maximize advantage. This tack requires the ability to identify and exploit such weakness. Success depends not so much on the efficient performance of procedures and techniques, but on understanding the specific characteristics of the enemy system.

Speed is rapidity of action. It applies to both time and space. Speed over time is tempo-the consistent ability to operate quickly. Speed over distance, or space, is the ability to move rapidly. Both forms are genuine sources of combat power. In other words, speed is a weapon. In war, it is rela tive speed that matters rather than absolute speed.

However, experience shows that we cannot sustain a high rate of speed indefinitely. As a result, a pattern develops: fast, slow, fast again. A competitive rhythm develops in combat with each belligerent trying to generate speed when it is advantageous.

While a necessary precondition of superiority, surprise is also a genuine source of combat power in its own right because of its psychological effect. Surprise can decisively affect the outcome of combat far beyond the physical means at hand.

We want to attack the source of enemy strength, but we do not want to attack directly into that strength. We obviously stand a better chance of success by concentrating our strength against some relative enemy weakness. So we also ask ourselves: Where is the enemy vulnerable?

Boldness is an essential moral trait in a leader for it generates combat power beyond the physical means at hand. Initiative, the willingness to act on one's own judgment, is a prerequisite for boldness. These traits carried to excess can lead to rashness, but we must realize that errors by junior leaders stemming from overboldness are a necessary part of learning. We should deal with such errors leniently; there must be no "zero defects" mentality. Abolishing "zero defects initiative through the threat of punishment. It does not mean that commanders do not counsel subordinates on mistakes; constructive criticism is an important element in learning. Nor does it give subordinates free license to act stupidly or recklessly.

Until a commander has reached and stated a decision, subordinates should consider it their duty to provide honest, professional opinions even though these may be in disagreement with the senior's opinions. However, once the decision has been reached, juniors then must support it as if it were their own. Seniors must encourage candor among subordinates and must not hide behind their grade insignia. Ready compliance for the purpose of personal advancement-the behavior of "yes-men"-will not be tolerated.

Critiques are an important part of training because critical self-analysis, even after success, is essential to improvement. Their purpose is to draw out the lessons of training. As a result, we should conduct critiques immediately after completing training, before memory of the events has faded. Critiques should be held in an atmosphere of open and frank dialogue in which all hands are encouraged to contribute. We learn as much from mistakes as from things done well, so we must be willing to admit mistakes and discuss them.

Commanders should see the development of their subordinates as a direct reflection on themselves.

Besides traits such as endurance and courage that all warfare demands, maneuver warfare puts a premium on certain particular human skills and traits. It requires the temperament to cope with uncertainty. It requires flexibility of mind to deal with fluid and disorderly situations.

Our philosophy of command must also exploit the human ability to communicate implicitly. We believe that implicit communication-to communicate through mutual understanding, using a minimum of key, well-understood phrases or even anticipating each other's thoughts-is a faster, more effective way to communicate than through the use of detailed, explicit instructions.

We develop this ability through familiarity and trust, which are based on a shared philosophy and shared experience. This concept has several practical implications. First, we should establish long-term working relationships to develop the necessary familiarity and trust. Second, key people-"actuals"-should talk directly to one another when possible, rather than through communicators or messengers. Third, we should communicate orally when possible, because we communicate also in how we talk-our inflections and tone of voice. Fourth, we should communicate in person when possible because we communicate also through our gestures and bearing.

Our philosophy also requires familiarity among comrades because only through a shared understanding can we develop the implicit communication necessary for unity of effort.

The further ahead we think, the less our actual influence can be. Therefore, the further ahead we consider, the less precision we should attempt to impose. Looking ahead thus becomes less a matter of direct influence and more a matter of laying the groundwork for possible future actions. As events approach and our ability to influence them grows, we have already developed an appreciation for the situation and how we want to shape it.

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